Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

James Willard Hearn Vs. State of Utah : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
ROBERT B. HANSEN, CRAIG L. BARLOW; Attorneys for RespondentCLINT S. JUDKINS;
Attorney for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Hearn v. Utah, No. 16940 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2225

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
....

-

- - - - - - - -. - - - -

JAMES WILLARD HEARN,
Plaintiff~Appellant,

Case No.
16940

-vsSTATE OF UTAH,
Defendant-Respondent.

:
--------------

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL OF A PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE FIRST
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE VENOY CHRISTOFFERSEN, JUDGE

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent
CLINT S. JUDKINS
113 West Main Street
Tremonton, Utah 84337
Attorney for Appellant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE_ OF THE CASE-----------------DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT----------------------RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL--------------------~--------STATEMENT OF FACTS----------------------------------ARGUMENT
POINT I:
PETITIONER CANNOT INSTITUTE A
PROCEEDING UNDER RULES 65B (f)
AND (i) BECAUSE HE IS NOT
PRESENTLY IMPRISONED IN UTAH---POINT II:
REQUIRING PETITIONER TO
COMPLETE THE UNEXPIRED PORTION
OF HIS SENTENCE IS NOT A VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS-------------------------POINT III: PETITIONER SHOULD NOT BE
EXCUSED FROM COMPLETING THE
UNEXPIRED PORTION OF HIS
SENTENCE ON THE GROUNDS HE
BEGAN SERVICE OF HIS SENTENCE
BEFORE HE WAS RETURNED TO
WASHINGTON---------------------CONCLUSION-------------------------------------------

1
1
2
2

3

4

6
9

CASES CITED
O'Glesby v. Leeke, 210 S.E.2d 232 (So. Carolina
1974)--------------------------------------Saunders v. State, 397 A.2d 548 (Del. 1979)----------Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978)-----------Williams v. Dalsheim, 480 F.Supp. 1049 (1979)---------

6
8
8
9

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-4 (1953), as amended----------- 7
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65B(i)------------ 3

-iSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES WILLARD HEARN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

Case No. 16940

STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus challenges
Utah's right to force petitioner to finish a sentence, which
was inadvertantly begun in 1970, after he completes the sentence
he is presently serving in the United States penitentiary in
M~rion,

Illinois.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The petition was filed in the First Judicial District

Court of Utah.

A hearing was held on February 15, 1980 with

the Honorable Venoy Christofferson presiding.

Judge Christoffers,

denied the petition on the grounds that the Court did not have
jurisdiction to issue the Writ of Habeas Corpus when the
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petitioner was not imprisoned in the State of Utah.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the denial of the petition.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

\

In 1970 petitioner, while imprisoned at the
Washington State Penitentiary, requested that a final
disposition be made of charges against him in Box Elder
County, Utah.

In accordance with the provisions of the

Interstate Agreement on Detainers (hereafter IAD) petitioner
was sent to Utah where he was tried and convicted for robbery
and sentenced to not less than 25 years in prison.

(R. 42).

Petitioner had served a few months of this sentence at the
Utah State Prison when Washington notified Utah that,
according to the provisions of the IAD, petitioner should
have been returned to Washington.

Before returning petitioner

to Washington, Judge Christofferson informed him that he
would be required to return to Utah, after he completed his
Washington sentence.
On April 9, 1976, petitioner was transferred from
Washington State Penitentiary to the United States Penitentiaey
in Marion, Illinois, where he presently is serving time.
After the transfer, Utah placed a detainer on petitioner for
his Utah sentence.

Petitioner filed a petition for Writ of
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Habeas Corpus in the First Judicial District of Utah, which
was denied on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction.
It is from this denial that petitioner appeals.
Petitioner asserts that this action is being
brought under Title 28 Section 2254(b) United States Code
Ann., which provides that a prisoner can seek federal relief
under the statute if he has exhausted all his state remedies.
Respondent does not treat this issue because it is inappropriate
in this forum.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONER CANNOT INSTITUTE A PROCEEDING UNDER RULES 65B (f) and (i)
BECAUSE HE IS NOT PRESENTLY IMPRISONED IN UTAH.
Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
any person imprisoned in the penitentiary
or county jail under a commitment of any
court, . . . who asserts that in any proceedings which resulted in his commitment
there was a substantial denial of his rights
under the Constitution of the United -States
or of the State of Utah, or both, may
institute a proceeding under this rule.
Rule 65B(i) requires that a person be imprisoned in
Utah before he can institute a proceeding under the rule.

At

present, petitioner is imprisoned in Marion Federal Prison, in
Marion, Illinois, and therefore he does not have standing to
challenge the legality of a sentence, which is not presently
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being imposed on him.

Respondent asserts that this Court

does not have jurisdiction to issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus
when petitioner is not presently being restrained in the
State of Utah.
POINT II
REQUIRING PETITIONER TO COMPLETE THE
UNEXPIRED PORTION OF HIS SENTENCE IS
NOT A VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS.
Petitioner relies on a number of cases to support
his allegation that his constitutional rights would be violated
if he is forced to return to Utah to complete the unexpired
oortion of his sentence.

~However,

the issue raised bv petitionel

has not ripened into a controversy worthy of adjudication
because petitioner is not presently being restrained by Utah.
Therefore, there is not sufficient immediacy to petitioner's
claim to make it appropriate for judicial determination.

Even

if it were appropriate to consider the issue raised by
petitioner the facts of the cases he cites and the instant
case are not analogous.

In fact, the instant case is so far

removed from the cases petitioner cites that the principles of
law adopted therein are wholly inapplicable to the instant
case.
Petitioner's transfer, which was executed under the
IAD, is different from the prisoner transfers in the cases
he cites.

Petitioner cites cases where asylum states lost
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jurisdiction over prisoners by extraditing them to other
states, where new sentences were imposed on them.

In other

cases cited by petitioner, prisoners released by mistake
from prison, due to no fault of their own were forced to
return and complete their sentences.

In this case Utah

took temporary custody of petitioner to make a final
disposition of the charges pending against him.

The transaction

was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the IAD.
In the cases petitioner cites the asylum states waived
jurisdiction over the prisoners by extraditing them or
releasinq them from Prison.

Here, Washinqton did not waive

iurisdiction over petitioner, but merelv allowed Utah to
have temPorarv custodv of him until he was tried and sentenced.
Furthermore, in each case cited by petitioner, it
was the asylum state that was trying to reacquire jurisdiction
over the prisoners.

In this case Utah was the receiving state

and as such was required by the provisions of the IAD to return
petitioner to Washington after a final disposition was made
of the charges against h.im.

The situation in the instant

case is the reverse of the situations in the cases petitioner
cites.

To hold as petitioner suggests that Utah waived

jurisdiction over petitioner by returning him to the sending
state would defeat the purpose of the IAD.

Any state, after

it tried a prisoner from another jurisdiction, would be
faced with a dilemma.
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It could return the prisoner and lose the right
to impose a sentence on him, or it could immediately impose
the sentence and violate the provisions of the IAD.

Therefore,

it is implicit that after a prisoner completes his sentence

in the sending state that the receiving state can reacquire
jurisdiction over him to impose on him his sentence.
Finally, the cases that petitioner cites demonstrate
situation~

where reincarceration of the prisoner was

with the principles of justice.

inconsist~

However, petitioner in this

case has failed to show how forcing him to serve his sentence
would be violating his

co~stitutional

rights.

The case of O'Glesby v. Leeke, 210 S.E.2d 232
(So. Carolina 1974), states that a sentence can be satisfied
by death, service of the required time, or relief therefrom
by competent authority.

Because petitioner is not pres·ently

imprisoned in Utah the issue he raises is not ripe for
adjudication.

Therefore, there i·s nO -competent authority to

excuse petitioner from the service of his sentence at this
time, nor are the cases cited by petitioner relevant to the
issue he has raised.
POINT III
PETITIONER SHOULD NOT BE EXCUSED FROM
COMPLETING THE UNEXPIRED PORTION OF HIS
SENTENCE ON THE GROUNDS HE BEGAN SERVICE
OF HIS SENTENCE BEFORE HE WAS RETURNED
TO WASHINGTON.
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The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is found in
Section 77-65-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
Article V(e) of the IAD provides, "at the earliest practicable
time consonant with the purpose of this agreement, the
prisoner shall be returned to the sending state."

Petitioner

alleges that after he was convicted and sentenced in Utah he
began serving his sentence at the Utah State Prison instead
of being returned to Washington.

However, petitioner should

not be excused from serving his sentence on the grounds that
Utah inadvertantly detained petitioner before returning him
to Washington.
Article IX of the IAD begins, "This agreement shall
be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purpose."
The purpose of IAD, as stated in Article I, is to provide for
the orderly and expeditious disposition of charges and detainers
outstanding against prisoners because these charges obstruct
programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.

The facts

outlined by petitioner indicate that the purpose of the IAD
was effectuated.

A final disposition was made of the charges

against petitioner before he was returned to Washington.
though Utah failed to immediately return petitioner to
Washington, this does not entitle him to be excused from
serving his sentence because the purpose of the IAD was
effectuated.
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Even

Saunders v. State, 397 A. 2d 548

(Del. 1979), parallei

the instant case in that the defendant sought habeas corpus
relief for

,Delaware's violation of the IAD.

In Saunders,

the defendant had been sent to Delaware, convicted, and
sentenced to 14 years in the state penitentiary.

This

conviction was reversed, but in the interim between the
conviction and reversal the defendant was convicted of
murder.

The defendant claimed that he should have been

returned to the federal authorities after his conviction
and not tried on new charges, which were not the basis for
the original detainer.

The Court rejected this claim and

dismissed his petition because the defendant failed to
particularize which section of the IAD had been violated
and because he failed to demonstrate how Delaware's delay
iri returning him had violated the policies and purposes of
the IAD.
Furthermore, petitioner is not entitled to relief
because petitioner was not prejudiced, nor were his rights
violated by Utah's inadvertent noncompliance with Article
V(e).
528

This Court outlined in Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d

(Utah 1978), when a writ of habeas corpus can be used:

"the rule may be used in exigent circumstances • • • or where
there has been such unfairness or failure to accord due process
of law that it would be wholly unconscionable not to· re-examine
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the conviction."

Id. at 530.

The New York District Court

in Williams v. Dalsheim, 480 F.Supp. 1049 (1979), denied a
habeas corpus petition, which claimed the IAD had been
violated.

The Court stated:
Since the heart of the agreement is
to protect a prisoner's rehabilitative
opportunities, a violation should be
considered in a federal collateral
proceeding in terms of prejudice it
causes a prisoner.

Id. at 1054.

Petitioner's claims in the instant case do

not rise to the required level of seriousness which would
make the granting of this petition appropriate.

Nor do the

facts presented by petitioner indicate that his status at
the Washington State Prison was prejudiced by his temporary
incarceration in Utah before he was returned to Washington.
Petitioner alleges that the detainer Utah has
lodged against him at the federal prison in Marion, Illinois,
had a deleterious effect on his parole hearing.

However,

this fact is not relevant to the question of whether Utah
can force petitioner to complete his sentence.

Any complaint

involving the manner in which his parole hearing was
conducted should be brought to the attention of the federal
authorities in Illinois.
CONCLUSION
Respondent asserts that the order of the court
below denying the petition for a Writ of Habeas "Corpus
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should be affirmed for the following reasons.

First,

because petitioner is not presently imprisoned in Utah
the issue he raises is not ripe for judicial determination,
nor can he seek post-conviction relief under Rules 65B(f)
and (i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure..

Second, petitioner's

allegations do not make out a deprivation of his constitutional rights.

Third, petitioner was not prejudiced by

Utah's temporary noncompliance with Article V(e) of the
IAD.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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